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Online Social Networks (OSNs), such as Facebook, provide users with tools to share information along with
a set of privacy controls preferences to regulate the spread of information. Current privacy controls are
efficient to protect content data. However, the complexity of tuning them undermine their efficiency when
protecting contextual information (such as the social network structure) that many users believe being kept
private.
In this paper, we demonstrate the extent of the problem of information leakage in Facebook. In particular,
we show the possibility of inferring, from the network “surrounding” a victim user, some information that the
victim set as hidden. We developed a system, named OSSINT (Open Source Social Network INTelligence),
on top of our previous tool SocialSpy, that is able to infer hidden information of a victim profile and retrieve
private information from public one. OSSINT retrieves the friendship network of a victim and shows how it
is possible to infer additional private information (e.g., user personal preferences and hobbies). Our proposed
system OSSINT goes extra mile about the network topology information, i.e., predicting new friendships
using the victim’s friends of friends network (2-hop of distance from the victim profile), and hence possibly
deduce private information of the full Facebook network. OSSINT correctly improved the previous results
of SocialSpy predicting an average of 11 additional friendships with peaks of 20 new friends. Moreover,
OSSINT, for the considered victim profiles demonstrated how it is possible to infer real life information such
as current city, hometown, university, supposed being private.
1. INTRODUCTION
Online Social Networks (OSNs) are popular web applications that allow users to build
connections, establish relationships, and exchange information over the Internet. At
the same time, OSNs hold treasure troves of information which are “insufficiently”
protected by default privacy preferences, by generally applying access control rules
to content or users. For instance, Facebook Folders and the Google Plus Circles allow
the definition of different privacy rules per group, whereas Instagram allows personal
pages to be defined as private. However, those privacy preferences are by default hard
to use and do not correctly reflect the intentions of users [Consumer Reports Magazine
2012; Madejski et al. 2012], which may lead to leakage of information to a wider audi-
ence than just their friends. The privacy issues on OSNs has been a topic of interest
within the research community demonstrated by several studies [Gross and Acquisti
2005; Beato et al. 2011; Tang et al. 2011; Conti et al. 2013; Kosinski et al. 2013; Cas-
cavilla et al. 2015]. Even though the offered privacy controls are somehow effective
to protect the data shared, they remain ineffective when protecting contextual infor-
mation (such as the social network structure) that many users believe being an infor-
mation kept private, instead leading to the possible leakage of private and sensitive
information.
In order to analyse the leakage of information in OSNs, such as Facebook, we pro-
pose the use of Open Source INTelligence (OSINT) techniques to extract and infer
information from publicly available data sources [osint.it 2015; Steele 2007]. In partic-
ular, we aim at extracting publicly available data from Facebook and infer information
that is set by users to private by means of privacy settings rules. To demonstrate the
aforementioned issues, we set up two main targets:
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—Q1: Would it be possible (and if so, to which extent) to reconstruct personal and
supposed hidden friends list?
—Q2: Is it possible (and if so, to which extent) to infer personal private information
like work, education, hometown, current city of a victim user from his social network
(friends and friends of friends)?
To respond to our research questions, we built a system, named OSSINT (Open
Source Social Network Intelligence), on top of our previous developed SocialSpy [Bu-
rattin et al. 2015] that exploits the Mutual Content Page (MCP) available in Face-
book displaying common content among two users [Constine 2010]. OSSINT receives
as input the list of friends, also called Friends Found list (the SocialSpy output), re-
trieved by SocialSpy from a victim user. Through the MCP, OSSINT retrieves the
common friends between the owner of the friends list (victim user) and all the IDs
from its Friends Found list. OSSINT improves previous results of SocialSpy by pre-
dicting multiple-hop friendships (link prediction), such as 2-hop connections (friends-
of-friends). In addition, by extracting structural and contextual information OSSINT
manages to reconstruct the friendship graph of a victim user along with the impor-
tance weight of friends. Hence, it is possible to use the surrounding network (2-hop
network composed of friends and friends-of-friends) of a victim profile to infer extra
personal information that is supposedly hidden by the privacy preferences. Finally, we
undeline that our system, OSSINT, does not exploit any Facebook system flaw like
those in [Abezgauz 2013] and [McGoogan 2016] to retrieve victim’s information.
Contribution. The contribution of this work is manifold. First, we demonstrate that
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), applied to OSNs, allows to retrieve a significant
amount of information that users consider, set, and believe is kept private to any
prying eyes or third parties, and particularly to other users of the OSN. Second, we
are capable to rebuild the friendship graph of a victim user. Hence from the friend-
ship graph we evaluate the weight of each friendship based on the number of shared
friends. Then, we are also able to extend our finding to multiple-hop connections, in
particular showing how to rebuild and learn information of users in the 2-hop net-
work of the victim. Finally, using the friendship graph we exhibit the possibility of
rebuilding other private attributes from the 2-hop network, such as personal informa-
tion, and the possibility to extend to retrieve the full Facebook graph information. On
all our testing cases, OSSINT, correctly improved the results of SocialSpy finding a
longer set of friends by link prediction applied to the 2-hop users. With an average of
11 new friendships and peaks of 20 new friends found from the 2-hop network, OS-
SINT demonstrated the feasibility and the correctness of our assumption. Moreover,
for all the victim profiles, OSSINT demonstrated how it is possible to infer real life
information supposed being private.
Organization. The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we review the state of the art. In Section 3 we give a formalization of Facebook and of
our system OSSINT. In Section 4 we give an overview of OSSINT, showing the inter-
action between SocialSpy and OSSINT, our proposed system. In Section 5 we give all
the technical details of OSSINT, how it works, what are the tools and the techniques
used, an example of the output. In Section 6 we present our experimental settings and
discuss the results. Finally, Section 7 draws some conclusions, limitations and future
works.
2. RELATED WORK
There are several studies regarding privacy in Online Social Networks (OSNs) in the
literature. These works revealed the lack of privacy and security in OSNs and how
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simple it is, in some cases, to get private information about users. Unfortunately, many
OSNs users are unaware of the security risks which exist in these types of communi-
cations.
Recent studies [Acquisti and Gross 2006; Boshmaf et al. 2011] showed how many
OSNs users expose personal details about themselves, their friends, and their rela-
tionships, whether by posting photos or by directly providing information such as a
home address and a phone number. Furthermore, according to [Nagle and Singh 2009]
and to [Boshmaf et al. 2011], the Facebook users accept friendship requests from peo-
ple whom they do not know but with whom they simply have friends in common. By
accepting these friendship requests, users unknowingly disclose their private informa-
tion to strangers. Obviously the leakage of information is not due only to the friend-
ship requests from strangers but also to the difficulties in correctly tune the privacy
settings in the different social networks. Almost 13 million users said they had never
set, or did not know about Facebook’s privacy tools. Furthermore, 36% of users share
all, or almost all, their wall posts with an audience wider than just their friends [Con-
sumer Reports Magazine 2012]. According to our studies and experiments, we hardly
believe that users are completely aware of actual privacy that OSNs provide them. On
the other hand, whenever users know that their profiles have some information leak-
ages, they are often too lazy (or inexperienced) to properly modify the privacy options
and make the profile private [Wisniewski et al. 2016; Madejski et al. 2012]. However,
even when the user configures his profile in a proper way, problems may arise with the
privacy settings of third-party applications. For example, the current Graphical User
Interface (GUI) of Facebook does not help inexperienced users in understanding what
kind of permissions are better to give to an application to keep a good level of privacy
[Chaney 2013]. Using this Facebook GUI, a user simply authorizes the application to
have access to (all) his data. Once the application is authorized, the data from the user
could become publicly available.
Several studies over the years tried to study what are the privacy and security risks
originated from the use of OSNs. Interesting surveys, articles and journals are avail-
able online [Gross and Acquisti 2005; Bernhard et al. 2009; Lee and Sara 2013; Fire
et al. 2013] and all of them try to explain what are the risks, what are the problems
and how to try to get rid from threats. In particular, the survey of Fire et al. [Fire
et al. 2013] is an interesting study about threats and solutions in OSNs. The survey
is divided in Threats and Solutions part. In the Threats paragraph Fire et al. classify
the attacks in four categories: Classic Threats, Modern Threats, Combination Threats
and Threats Targeting Children. Each category explains in details the available at-
tacks. Classical Threats contains attacks like “Malaware”, “Phishing Attacks”, “Spam-
mers”, etc. Modern Threats contains attacks like “Clickjacking”, “De-Anonymization
Attacks”, “Face Recognition”, “Fake Profiles”, etc. Combination Threats is the com-
bination of classic and modern threats in order to create a more sophisticated at-
tack. Lastly Threats Targeting Children that contains attacks like “Online Predators”,
“Risky Behaviors”, “Cyberbulling”. Then we have the Solutions paragraph divided in
three main categories: Operator Solutions, Commercial Solutions and Academic Solu-
tions. In the last category we have the solutions proposed from [Lipford et al. 2008;
Fang and LeFevre 2010; Fire et al. 2012; Paul et al. 2012].
It is, however, possible to find in the literature several studies that aim at showing
how it is possible to attack OSNs platforms and retrieve supposedly hidden informa-
tion [Mislove et al. 2010; Mahmud et al. 2014; Gu et al. 2016]. Counter posed there are
studies that try to propose defenses to protect OSNs from attacks. Anyway all these
studies are mainly academic contributions that we classify as “Attacks” and “Solu-
tions”.
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An attack example is in [Burattin et al. 2015]. Burattin et al. demonstrate how
it is possible to retrieve the friends list of a victim user in Facebook, using public
information. Results have an average of 25% of hidden friends found and with peaks of
70%. The work in [Burattin et al. 2015] shows that the lack of information of Facebook
gives the possibility to an attacker to retrieve information supposedly hidden. Then
there is the solutions category where we have works that try to mitigate the lack of
information from OSNs. A solution is proposed by Fire et al. in [Fire et al. 2013] with
Social Privacy Protector software (SPP). The SPP software consists of two main parts,
namely, a Firefox add-on and a Facebook application. The two parts provide Facebook
users with three different layers of protection. The first layer enables Facebook users
to easily control their profile privacy. The second layer notifies users of the number of
applications installed on their profile which may impose a threat to their privacy. The
third layer, a Facebook application, analyzes a user’s friends list.
Lastly we have a less studied problem, the social graph privacy: preventing data
aggregators from reconstructing large portions of the social graph, composed of users
and their friendship links. Knowing who a victim’s friends are is a valuable informa-
tion to retrieve other information related to the victim itself. Personal data privacy can
be managed by users using the privacy option from OSNs, while information about a
user’s interests, places or schools in the social graph can be revealed by any of the
user’s friends. The study in [Bonneau et al. 2009] examines the difficulty of computing
graph statistics given a random sample of K edges from each node, and found that
many properties can be approximated. Our study shows how it is possible to recon-
struct a friendship graph of a victim profile. Using the SocialSpy tool, first we retrieve
the friends list of a victim user. Then we re-run SocialSpy on the IDs from the friends
list of our victim in order to have a 2-hop friends lists. Once we have the friends list we
use OSSINT to build a friendship graph of our victim ID. The system gives us the pos-
sibility to know who are the closest friends of our victim, to de-anonymize those users
with an high level of privacy that were not retrievable by SocialSpy, and to profile our
victim user using the information available from the 1-hop IDs.
3. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we formalise our “system model”, i.e., the environment where our tool
could be immersed, in order to retrieve the information. We assume Facebook as a
representative implementation of such environment.
Facebook is composed of different entities. All these entities, together, give the possi-
bility to the final user to perform different actions into such environment. The entities
we consider are: pages, users, groups and pictures. Users are allowed to perform some
actions: become “friend” of another user, “like” a page (and revoke the “like”), “join” a
group (and leave the group), and “like” or “comment” pictures (and revoke the “like”
or delete the “comment”). Instead, pages, groups and pictures are “passive” entities
(i.e., they are managed by users). The set of pages a user likes can be interpreted as
the tastes of that user. Usually pages enable public figures (such as companies, orga-
nizations, or celebrities) to create a presence on Facebook [Pineda 2010]. Groups on
Facebook are “places” where people can share and discuss their common interests and
express their opinion around common causes, issues or activities to organize [Pineda
2010]. A group is not always public: tuning its privacy rules, it is possible to set it
as public (accessible and searchable to all users in Facebook), private (accessible only
if invited; searchable to all users in Facebook) or hidden (accessible only if invited;
not searchable to anybody in Facebook). Pictures are usually uploaded by users. On
Facebook, it is really difficult to take under control the privacy settings of pictures.
There are pictures directly uploaded by a user, pictures where users are tagged, the
cover photo (that is always public by default) and profile pictures. Moreover, Facebook
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gives to its users the possibility to make the profile much more detailed filling fields
regarding personal hometown rather than the attended university or the current city.
More formally, the portion of Facebook that we are going to use in the rest of this
paper can be formalized as the tuple: Facebook = (U,P,G, I,C,S). Specifically, in this
notation, we have that:
—U is the set of users. A user u ∈ U represents a person. Each person can “like” a
page p, join a group g, leave comments into a page, request friendships to other users
(accept friendship from other users), upload pictures into his own profile pages.
— P is the set of pages. A page p ∈ P is something related to the tastes of a user, i.e.,
what a user might like.
—G = (G′, n) is the multiset that represents groups, where G′ ⊆ U and n : G′ → N≥1
is the multiplicity function indicating the number of groups with the same set of
users (please note that the same set of users may appear several times). G represents
all the groups on Facebook (please note the same set of users may appears several
times). A group, from the Facebook point of view, is a place where a user can promote,
share and discuss relevant topics.
— I is the set of pictures. Every picture i ∈ I can receive one or more “likes” and one or
more “comments” from a user u ∈ U. Therefore, it is possible to consider a picture as
the pair i = (U li , U ci ). Where U li ⊆ P(U) is the set of users that liked i, and U ci ⊆ P(U)
is the set of users that commented on i.
—C is the set of cities. An hometown h ∈ C represents the city where a user u was born.
Differently, cc ∈ C represents the current city where a user u currently lives.
— S is the set of schools. The education field e ∈ S represents the attended university of
the user u. Differently hs ∈ S represents the high schools attended by the user u.
Within our model, a user u is defined as the tuple u = (Personal, U, P,G, I, C, S),
where: Personal is the set of “personal” information (such as the name, the family
name, the age), U ⊆ U is the set of friends of u; L1, . . . , Lm ∈ U are corresponding
friends list of u1, ..., um; P ⊆ P is set of pages u likes; G ⊆ G is the set of groups u
belongs to; and I ⊆ I is the set of personal pictures (pictures that u uploaded into the
social network); C ⊆ C is the set of cities where u was born and where is currently
living; S ⊆ S is the set of schools where the user u attended the university classes
and the high schools lectures. Given a user u we can extract each component using
a projection operator pi. For example, piC(u) = cc the current city of our victim user,
rather then piE(u) = e for the attended university of our victim and, lastly, piH(u) = h
for the hometown of our victim. Due to all these interacting entities, and their complex
set of privacy settings, we truly believe that there is a real possibility of a leak of
information out of Facebook.
4. OSSINT: RETRIEVING PRIVATE INFORMATION
The aim of this work is to show how the friends list can be used as master key to
retrieve private information of a victim user that thinks to have set a high level of
privacy on a personal Facebook profile. Fig. 1 gives a graphical representation of our
approach and of the involved entities.
The system is composed of two main parts. The first and main part improves the
result of our previous tool SocialSpy [Burattin et al. 2015]. Then, differently from the
previous tool, OSSINT focuses its analysis at 2-hop of distance. To achieve this, we run
SocialSpy on the victim user ID and on all the friends returned out of the first run.
Therefore, if SocialSpy finds n friends for a victim, we will run it again against all of
them, resulting in a total of n+ 1 runs of SocialSpy.
Within a big pool of 2-hop friends (i.e., friends of friends of our victim), OSSINT finds
new connection and new friends of our victim user. Moreover exploiting all the found
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Fig. 1: Flow chart and interaction of SocialSpy and OSSINT.
connections, the system is able to retrieve information regarding the current city, the
hometown and the education of a victim profile. This constitutes the second part of our
system. As mention in our previous work [Burattin et al. 2015], we decided to have
as target the friends list of a victim user because we believed this is one of the most
important information on Facebook. With OSSINT we can assert that the friends list
of a victim user is, indeed, the weakest link in order to exploit private information.
In order to retrieve the friends list we based OSSINT on the result of our previous
work in [Burattin et al. 2015]. SocialSpy exploits different strategies to fetch this in-
formation, however, as we showed in our previous work, the most effective way is to
exploit the victim’s pictures (I, according to our system model). These (or a subset of
them), many times, are left publicly available and the strategy we proposed exploits
the likes and the comments that each public picture received. In particular, given a
picture i ∈ I, belonging to the victim v, we can retrieve all the users that liked or
commented the picture. Each of them, using Mutual Content Page, is checked for his
friendship with v. Algorithm 1 illustrates the steps of SocialSpy in order to retrieve the
friends list of a victim user fetching the information from publicly available pictures.
We used the same strategy in OSSINT and we decided to apply it not only at 1-hop
of distance from our victim profile, but also at 2-hop (friends-of-friends) of distance.
The idea is to improve the pool of IDs on which find new possible friends. Moreover the
computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n) where n is the number of images.
Algorithm 2 shows how OSSINT extracts 2-hop IDs using the Mutual Content Page
(MCP).
Algoritm 2 takes v as input, and for each ID from the friends list of v (line 2) applies
SocialSpy (line 4) to retrieve the friends list of all the IDs from the friends list of v,
extracting the common friends. Then, it extracts all the common friends between ui
and uj . ui belongs to the friends list of v meanwhile uj belongs to the friends list of ui.
Algoritm 2 then, per each uj from the friends list of ui, extracts the common friends
(line 5). The computational complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(nm) where n is the number
of friends of v and m is the maximum number of 2-hop friends.
Please note that 2-hop friends are not necessarily friends of our victim user, as re-
ported in the example in Fig. 2.
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ALGORITHM 1: SocialSpy (using “Strategy 4” (S4), Likes and Comments).
Data: Victim user v
Result: Set of friends of v
1 I ← set of public images of v
2 CandidateFriends← ∅
3 foreach i ∈ I do
/* Add candidate friends set all users that liked or commented the image */
4 CandidateFriends← CandidateFriends ∪ U li ∪ Uci
5 FriendsFound← ∅
6 foreach c ∈ CandidateFriends do
/* Check friendship with Mutual Content Page */
7 if AreFriends(c, v) then
8 FriendsFound← FriendsFound ∪ {c}
9 return FriendsFound
ALGORITHM 2: Set of potentials friends at 2-hop of distance from v.
Data: Victim user v
Result: The map of each tuple (ui, uj) and its common friends.
1 List_dicts = [ ]
2 foreach ui ∈ socialspy(v) do
3 dict_temp = { }
4 foreach uj ∈ socialspy(ui) do
/* Extracts mutual friends using MCP */
5 dict_temp[(ui, uj)] =M_F (ui, uj)
6 List_dicts.append(dict_temp)
7 return List_dicts
v 1-hop_ID-x 2-hops_ID-yare friends are friends
Fig. 2: Example of 2-hop friends after the execution of SocialSpy. 2-hop_ID-y not friend
of the victim v.
Fig. 2 shows the result after the execution of SocialSpy on victim v and on 1-hop_ID-
x. In order to increase the results of SocialSpy, and then the possibilities to find new
friendships at 2-hop, we apply Algorithm 2 on 1-hop_ID-x and 2-hop_ID-y. The result
of the execution of Algorithm 2 is depicted Fig. 3.
As above mentioned, Fig. 3 shows the output after the execution of SocialSpy and
after the execution of Algorithm 2 on a victim ID. OSSINT produces then a set of
friends of v, a set of friends for the friends of v and a map data structure where the
key of the map is composed by 1-hop friends of v and 2-hop IDs friend of the 1-hop ID.
Each key is associated to the list of mutual friends. All the edges from Figures 2 and 3
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v 1-hop_ID-x 2-hops_ID-yare friends are friends
2-hops_M_F-1
2-hops_M_F-2
2-hops_M_F-n
. . .are friends
are friends
are friends
are friends
are friends
are friends
Fig. 3: Example of 2-hop candidate friends after the execution of Alg. 2 on v.
are dashed because it is now task of Algorithm 3 to connect all of them. Once all the
data are connected, Algorithm 3 will produce the friendship graph.
ALGORITHM 3: Production of the friendship graph G of v.
Data: Victim user v, List_dicts output of Algorithm 2
Result: G Friendship graph of v at 2-hop
1 V = [v]
2 E = [ ]
3 foreach ui ∈ socialspy(v) do
4 V.append(ui)
5 E.append((v, ui))
6 foreach uj ∈ socialspy(ui)\{v} do
7 if (uj 6∈ V ) then
8 V.append(uj)
9 E.append((ui, uj))
10 for uk ∈M_F (ui, uj) do
11 if (uk 6∈ V ) then
12 V.append(uk)
13 E.append(ui, uk)
14 E.append(uk, uj)
15 return G = (V,E)
Algoritm 3 is used in order to generate the friendship graph related to our victim
user. It takes as input all the outputs generated from the previous algorithms. Starting
with the set of friends of v, it connects all the IDs (line 3 to line 5). Once the 1-hop
friends are connected it is now the turn to add the 2-hop IDs. Lines 6, 8 and 9 take
care of this step, meanwhile line 7 removes the duplicates. Once the graph G results
connected at 2-hop, the algorithm uses the common friends in order to insert new edges
among the already connected IDs (line 10 to line 14). The output of Algorithm 3 is the
friendship graph of the victim v at 2-hop. The computational complexity of Algorithm 3
is O(nm∗n) where n is the number of friends of v and m is the maximum number of 2-
hop friends.
Algorithm 4 shows the steps to extract information and compute the rate of each
information from each feature (education, hometown and current_city) retrieved from
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ALGORITHM 4: Algorithm to extract and rate information from the IDs from the friends list
of v.
Data: Victim user v
Result: Information and the related rate
1 edu = {}
2 hometown = {}
3 cur_city = {}
4 M = |socialspy(v)|
5 foreach ui ∈ socialspy(v) do
6 if (piE(ui) 6∈ edu) then
7 edu[piE(ui)] = 1/M
8 else
9 edu[piE(ui)] = edu[piE(ui)] + 1/M
10 if (piH(ui) 6∈ hometown) then
11 hometown[piH(ui)] = 1/M
12 else
13 hometown[piH(ui)] = hometown[piH(ui)] + 1/M
14 if (piCC(ui) 6∈ cur_city) then
15 current_city[piCC(ui)] = 1/M
16 else
17 current_city[piCC(ui)] = current_city[ui.current_city] + 1/M
18 return (edu, hometown, curr_city)
the friends of v. In order to compute the rate of each element from each feature, Algo-
rithm 4 counts how many time the same information appears into the feature taken
into account over the number of friends of v. Where piE(ui), piH(ui), piCC(ui) are the
projections of Education, Hometown and Current_City.
Algorithm 4 computes the percentages of each feature education, hometown, cur-
rent_city extracted from the 1-hop users. Line 6 verifies that the information is not
already into edu{}, if not, it add the new feature into edu{}, otherwise, if the feature is
present, Algorithm 4 increment the counter for the same feature. The same action is
used also for the other features hometown and current_city. The computational com-
plexity of Algorithm 4 is O(n) where n is the number of friends of v.
Algorithm 5 shows the steps to score the likelihood of the 2-hop IDs. Moreover in
Algorithm 5 we use the function showed in Algorithm 4. Indeed this algorithm, first
extracts the information regarding education, hometown and current_city of the 2-hop
users, then score the likelihood based on the result given by Algorithm 4 applyed on
socialspy(v) users. In order to have more reliable likelihood score, Algorithm 5 takes
into account also the number of edges (common friends) among uj (2-hop user) and v.
Algorithm 5 takes a 2-hop user (line 6) and using the function proc_info(u) extracts
the value of the feature. On line 8 the feature retrieved from the 1-hop results is
education, on line 10 the feature is hometown and on line 12 the feature retrieved
is current_city. The related score from the 1-hop results is added into the variable
score. Line 14 calculates the average of all the scores previously extracted from the
1-hop users data. Line 15 extracts the number of edges (or common friends) from uj
(2-hop user) and v. Lines 16, 17 and 18 are in charge to find the highest number of
shared edges. Based on that all the other values are normalized using the highest one.
Lines 19 and 20 calculate the final score based on the extracted information and on
the number of shared edges.
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ALGORITHM 5: Algorithm to score the likelihood of IDs at 2-hop.
Data: Victim user v
Result: Score of likelihood of 2-hop users associated to v
/* See Algorithm 4 */
1 edu, hometown, cur_city = proc_info(v)
2 dict_scores = {}
3 score = 0
4 max = 0
5 foreach ui ∈ socialspy(v) do
6 foreach uj ∈ (socialspy(ui)\socialspy(v)) do
7 if uj 6∈ dict_scores then
8 if (piE(uj) ∈ edu) then
9 score = score+ edu[piE(uj)]
10 if (piH(uj) ∈ hometown) then
11 score = score+ hometown[piH(uj)]
12 if (piCC(uj) ∈ cur_city) then
13 score = score+ cur_city[piCC(uj)]
14 score = (score)/3
15 N = |socialspy(uj) ∩ socailspy(v)|
16 if max < N then
17 max = N
18 dict_scores[uj ] = (score,N)
19 foreach u ∈ dict_scores do
20 dict_scores[u] = (dict_scores[u][0] + (dict_scores[u][1]/max))/2
21 return dict_scores
Once Algorithm 5 returns the dict_score we compare each score of each ID with a
threshold defined looking at the optimum value among our data. If the score of the
ID at 2-hop is above our threshold we mark the user ID as “FRIEND” if below the ID
is marked as “NOT FRIEND”. The computational complexity of Algorithm 5 is O(nm)
where n is the number of friends of v and m are the 2-hop friends.
5. OSSINT: IMPLEMENTATION
OSSINT is able to fill the gap of SocialSpy between the retrieved friends list and the
possibility to have a graphical representation of the whole network of a victim user
at 2-hop. The OSSINT system receives as input the list of friends from the IDs found
after the execution of SocialSpy on a victim profile. The tool, then, iterates on each
ID (from the friends list of v) and their personal list of friends in order to extract all
the common IDs. After the execution of OSSINT on each ID (from v friends list) and
their personal friends list, it connects all the IDs at 1-hop with the IDs at 2-hop. The
common friends are then used as edges and also to find new connection among 1-hop
and 2-hop IDs.
In particular the tools used in our system OSSINT are:
(i) Mutual Content Page (MCP), i.e., a page that displays which content two users
have in common;
(ii) Selenium Web Driver to browse the Facebook MCP pages;
(iii) Graphviz python library to generate a .dot file that represents our output graph;
(iv) Gephi platform for the visualization and the manipulation of the graph.
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After the iteration of OSSINT on each 1-hop ID and the related friends list, we have
multiple output (.json) files where are listed all the common friends among each 1-hop
ID and the IDs from the related friends list. OSSINT can then connect v with its 1-hop
friends list and all the 1-hop IDs with the IDs at 2-hop using the common friends found
as edges.
5.1. Graph Notation
Table I shows the notation used in the next paragraphs. Each color corresponds to a
different type of user. The main actors are the victim, the friends of the victim, and
the friends of friends of the victim. Moreover, among them, we highlight the common
friends, the most relevant, and less relevant 2-hop IDs. Table I summarizes and ex-
plain all the colours used in the graphs in the following paragraphs.
Table I: Notation of the colours used in the graphs
Table of Colours
Victim user
Testing IDs and friends of victim user
Other friends of victim user
Friends of (friends of friends)
Friends of (friends of friends)
Friends of (friends of friends)
Most relevant 2-hop IDs used to predict new friendships of the victim
2-hop IDs with only one common friend with the victim (not relevant IDs)
Common friends between victim user and its testing friends
5.2. 1-Hop Strategy
We are now going to analyze in detail our approach. The first step of OSSINT is to run
SocialSpy on a victim user ID. The SocialSpy tool receives as input a victim ID and
returns the friends list of the victim. An example of the friends found list returned by
SocialSpy is the code in Listing 1.
Verifying friendship ($user_id_1=‘pa***’, $user_id_2=‘giuseppe.cascavilla ’)
GET: https ://www.facebook.com/pat ***? and=giuseppe.cascavilla&sk=friends
*** FRIEND FOUND *** -- 13 An*** (an***)
*** FRIEND FOUND *** -- 99 Va*** (va***)
*** FRIEND FOUND *** -- 272 Al*** (al***)
Listing 1: SocialSpy friends found list.
Listing 1 shows the output of SocialSpy. On the first line SocialSpy checks the friend-
ship using the MCP. The friendship is checked through the written "Friends since
[date]" available on the MCP. Once the friendship is checked, SocialSpy retrieves
the common friends. From the retrieved list (Listing 1) we depict the social graph of
our victim ID. Indeed, in case of 1-hop (IDs that share the friendship with our victim
profile) friends found list, our system OSSINT simply depicts the social graph of our
victim. In Fig. 4 an example of graph composed by those friends found at 1-hop. The
yellow, dark green and blue nodes are our testing nodes and together with the purple
nodes represent the 1-hop friends.
At glance we can notice as the friends found by SocialSpy (Listing 1) are part of our
graph depicted in Fig. 4 (dark green, blue and yellow nodes). The green node in the
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Fig. 4: 1-hop friendship graph after running SocialSpy. Green node: victim ID. 1-hop
friend IDs: Yellow, Dark Green, Blue and purple nodes.
center of our graph is our main victim profile. All the small nodes (purple nodes) are
other friends of our victim ID. Yellow, dark green and blue nodes are our testing IDs
and friends of our victim.
Once we have the friends list of our victim user we run SocialSpy on each user ID
from the retrieved friends found list. The result of this second round is composed by
all the friendship graphs of all the IDs from the list of friends of our victim user.
After this second round of SocialSpy we have, per each friend of our victim, a friend
found list like the one in Listing 1.
We can then depict the social graph of our retrieved IDs using OSSINT. In Fig. 5 an
example using the testing IDs from Fig. 4.
(a) Friendship graph of victim ID
va***.
(b) Friendship graph of victim ID
an***.
(c) Friendship graph of victim ID
al***.
Fig. 5: Graphs of friendship of three IDs that share the friendship with our victim user.
The three graphs in Fig. 5 depict three different friends network for the three testing
IDs from the victim friendship graph (Fig. 4). The dark green, blue and yellow nodes
are the “new” victim IDs from the giuseppe.cascavilla friends found list. These three
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victims are friends of our user giuseppe.cascavilla and on them we run our Social-
Spy tool. The node violet, brown and red represent respectively the friend IDs of our
victims (2-hop friends). Moreover the three graphs in Fig 5 give us two different infor-
mation. Graphs in Fig 5(a) and 5(b) reaffirm the friendship between our victim user
giuseppe.cascavilla and his friends found IDs. The Fig. 5(c) shows that our SocialSpy
tool, working on al*** ID, “failed” in finding our victim ID giuseppe.cascavilla. How-
ever since the friendship in a Facebook social network is an undirected edge, we can
assert that exists the friendship between giuseppe.cascavilla and al*** simply using
the data from giuseppe.cascavilla.
At this stage, our SocialSpy tool retrieved the lists of friends from our victim
ID giuseppe.cascavilla. SocialSpy, then, retrieved the lists of friends from the 1-
hop IDs (Fig. 5) composed of our testing victims va***, an***, al*** friends of
giuseppe.cascavilla. We have then a bunch of friends list files from all our target IDs.
At this point our SocialSpy tool becomes limited. Actually, with SocialSpy is not possi-
ble to link together all this friends list. Indeed, is not possible to build the friendship
graph of the victim giuseppe.cascavilla. Moreover, is not possible to infer private infor-
mation from the victim ID, giuseppe.cascavilla, because of its privacy settings. Lastly,
from our studies, we can assert that all these lists of friends can be linked together
using shared friendships as edges and in the next paragraphs we will show how we do
that.
5.3. 2-Hop Strategy: Proposed System
With the lists of friends retrieved by SocialSpy, we are now able to use OSSINT in
order to build the friends network of our victim profile.
The main steps of OSSINT can be summarized as follow:
(1) extracts all the common friends between each 1-hop ID and the IDs from friends
list retrieved by SocialSpy,
(2) produces the text version of the final friendships graph where all the IDs are con-
nected together based on the friendships,
(3) generates a visual representation of the final friendships graph of the victim user
at 2-hop of distance
(4) infer information regarding school, hometown and current city of a victim user
exploiting the publicly available information of the 1-hop IDs,
(5) produces the list of possible friends of the victim user found at 2-hop of distance
(link prediction among victim user and 2-hop IDs) and based on the information
retrieved from the 1-hop IDs.
Using the MCP and the Selenium Web Driver, OSSINT is able to retrieve all the
mutual links (also known as friendship) among the 1-hop IDs and the friends from
their friends list. The output of this iteration are multiple .json files where all the
common friends are listed .
An example in Listing 2.
{‘‘https ://www.facebook.com/an***? and=ID_1&sk=friends ’’: [‘‘al***.16’’, ‘‘al
***’’, ‘‘Bo***’’, ‘‘caf***’’, ‘‘ca***’’, ‘‘ce***’’, ‘‘cl***’’, ‘‘si***’’,
‘‘da***’’, ‘‘da***’’, ‘‘da***’’, ‘‘da***’’, ‘‘da***’’], ‘‘https :// www.
facebook.com/an***? and=ID_2&sk=friends ’’: [‘‘as***’’, ‘‘mi***’’, ‘‘Fo
***’’, ‘‘rel***’’, ‘‘ni***’’, ‘‘mi***’’, ‘‘lu***’’, ‘‘de***’’, ‘‘fre
***’’, ‘‘st***’’, ‘‘nu***’’, ‘‘de***’’, ‘‘di***’’], ... }
Listing 2: .json output file after running OSSINT system on an*** user ID.
OSSINT produces a .dot file right after finishes collecting all the .json files (con-
taining the common friends) among all the 1-hop IDs and the IDs from the 1-hop’s
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friends list. This .dot file is the text version of our final graph. Giving to Gephi our
generated .dot file we are able to have a visualization of our network at 2-hop of dis-
tance.
In Fig. 6 an example using the data from Figures 4 and 5.
Fig. 6: 2-hop IDs graph after running SocialSpy in conjuction with OSSINT.
For readability purpose, from Fig. 6 we removed all the purple nodes, friends of our
victim ID giuseppe.cascavilla (Fig. 4). However, it has to be taken into account that, for
each purple node, OSSINT makes the same steps as for the dark green, blue and yellow
nodes (our testing nodes). However, we now focus only on our three nodes: dark green,
blue and yellow and consider them as the only friends of giuseppe.cascavilla. From
Fig. 6 we then identify our victim ID (light green node) surrounded by its friends (dark
green node, blue node and yellow node). The dark green, blue and yellow nodes are the
1-hop IDs on which we applied SocialSpy to retrieve the 2-hop IDs. The 2-hop IDs are
identified by the grey nodes and the orange nodes. The common friends between the
victim ID and its friends are the light blue nodes. From our studies, we can assert that
the light blue nodes give us the information regarding who are the closest friends of
our victim. Indeed, we strongly believe that more are the common friends among two
users, stronger is the friendship among the involved users in a real life. We will now
focus on the 2-hop IDs to find new friends of giuseppe.cascavilla (orange nodes and the
grey nodes).
5.4. 2-Hop Strategy: Information Extraction
The network in Fig. 6 gives us some useful information regarding our victim ID.
(1) we have the list of friends of our victim ID giuseppe.cascavilla;
(2) we can infer who are the closest friends of giuseppe.cascavilla basing on the num-
ber of common IDs between the victim and its friends (higher is the number of
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common friends, higher is the possibility the two IDs know each other very well in
a real life);
(3) we have the list of users at 2-hop of distance;
(4) basing on the number of shared friends between the victim and each of the 2-hop
IDs, we can remove the “useless” 2-hop users (from Fig. 6 the grey nodes sharing
only one edge with only one friend of the victim), keeping the useful ones (from
Fig. 6 the orange nodes).
From the list of friends we retrieved and using the OSINT technique, we extract
the information regarding education, hometown and current city, publicly available,
from the IDs that share the friendship with giuseppe.cascavilla (in our case from dark
green, blue and yellow nodes). OSSINT produces an .xml file with all the considered
information from the friend IDs. In Listing 3 an example of the output file.
<?xml version ="1.0" encoding ="UTF -8"?>
<records >
<record >
<source_url >m.facebook.com/ID/about </source_url >
<education >School </education >
<hometown >Hometown </hometown >
<current_city >Current City </ current_city >
</record >
</records >
Listing 3: .xml output file from OSSINT.
After processing all the data from Listing 3, OSSINT produces an .xlsx file contain-
ing one table per each field education, hometown and current_city. Each table contains
all the rates regarding the information from Listing 3 retrieved from the 1-hop list of
IDs. Through this first step we are able to infer the personal information of our victim
user. Indeed we truly believe that the personal information of the IDs from the friends
list of our victim reflect the private information of our victim ID in a real life.
5.5. 2-Hop Strategy: Friends Extraction
After the steps described in Section 5.3, we now have a huge network, with a lot of IDs
at 2-hop of distance and all of them can be possible friends of our victim user. In order
to reduce the possibility of errors, because of the huge amount of IDs, we decided to
remove from the network, at 2-hop of distance, all the IDs with only one edge. Using as
example the graph in Fig. 6, we remove all the grey nodes that share only one friend
with our victim ID giuseppe.cascavilla. Differently, we keep all the IDs with more than
one common friend with giuseppe.cascavilla (Fig. 6 the orange nodes). The decision is
based on the fact that the higher is the number of common friends shared between
the 2-hop ID and the victim ID, the higher is the probability the victim shares the
friendship with the considered 2-hop ID. After removing the one-edge IDs, we apply the
OSINT technique on the remaining nodes. We extract then the personal information
publicly available from the IDs at 2-hop. As for the 1-hop IDs, also in this case OSSINT
produces an .xml file with all the personal information regarding our 2-hop IDs. The
output file contains the same tags as the one in Listing 3. As before, also in this case
the processing of the .xml file produces an .xlsx file containing one table per each field
education, hometown and current_city. However, differently from the previous file, we
now use these information to score each user ID. The score is based on how many
information fit between the 1-hop IDs statistics and the 2-hop information. In Table II
a scoring example.
Table II shows the rates regarding the information from the user IDs at 1-hop
(friends of our victim user giuseppe.cascavilla). These percentages will be part of our
scoring mechanism. In Table III an example of retrieved data from 2-hop IDs.
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Table II: Data example from 1-hop user IDs
Current City # % Homewtown # % Education # %
Padua 15 27% Padua 18 13% Padua 39 40%
Bologna 5 9% Rome 15 11% Venice 8 10%
Paris 2 4% Venice 3 3%
Madrid 1 2%
Table III: Data example from 2-hop user IDs
Source ID Current City Homewtown Education # Shared Edges
2-hop_ID-1 Padua Padua Padua 8
2-hop_ID-2 Brussels Turin Rome 3
2-hop_ID-3 Venice 10
2-hop_ID-4 Venice Venice 2
Table III shows the information retrieved from the IDs at 2-hop of distance.
The score is estimated basing on how many personal information fit with the data
from Table II and how many common friends are shared with our victim user
giuseppe.cascavilla. All the data are normalized between 0 and 1. If we suppose that
the highest number of shared edges is 10, we normalize the values in column # Shared
Edges dividing by 10 all the values. In Table IV a scoring example.
Table IV: Example of scoring based on data from Table II and Table III
Source ID Information Score Edges Score
2-hop_ID-1 0.266 0.8
2-hop_ID-2 0.016 0.3
2-hop_ID-3 0.010 1.0
2-hop_ID-4 0.033 0.2
Table IV shows an example of scoring 2-hop IDs. Information Score is the average
score based on the data from Table II. Edges Score is a score based on the normaliza-
tion of the value given by the number of shared friends between the 2-hop IDs and the
victim user giuseppe.cascavilla.
In order to understand if a 2-hop ID can be highlighted as “FRIEND” or “NOT
FRIEND” of our victim ID giuseppe.cascavilla, we compare Information Score and
Edges Score values with our “Best Value”. The “Best Value” scores are respec-
tively the optimum value of Information Score and the optimum value of Edges
Score from all our victim IDs from all our data. Thus “Best Value” are two fixed pa-
rameters, respectively Best Information Value and Best Edges Value, with which
to compare the score of our 2-hop IDs. Lastly, if a 2-hop ID is scored with both the
values equal or higher than our “Best Value”, the considered ID is highlighted as
“FRIEND”, otherwise marked as “NOT FRIEND”.
6. EVALUATION
To evaluate our approach, we conducted several experiments on 8 different real profiles
of selected volunteers. We chose only victim IDs that are using the Facebook privacy
option. Indeed for our experiments we decided to choose only Facebook profiles with an
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high level of privacy and with a really low disclosure of information from the personal
profile. This is due to the fact that we truly believe that even with an high accuracy in
tuning the privacy options, the disclosure of information can happen through the sur-
rounding network (friends and friend-of-friends). All the victim IDs are real profiles. To
each of them we asked to share with us their personal friends list. The personal friends
list of our victim profiles has been used as ground truth for our experiments. Thus, to
score the precision of our technique, we compared the results of our experiments from
each victim ID with the real data from the personal friends list.
To perform our tests, we logged into Facebook using more than twenty different
accounts. All of them are part of a network composed by only those accounts used for
the experiments. This is in order to appear to Facebook as real profiles and avoid to be
blocked. All the accounts do not share anything with all the victim IDs tested during
our experiments. As above mentioned, for our experiments we decided to use only users
with an high privacy concern. All of them do not show anything about their personal
information. The victim profiles have an amount of publicly available pictures between
1 and 13. Most of them are cover pictures. Regarding the friends list, differently from
the other information, only 1 profile out of 8 have a public friends list. However even if
the friends list is publicly available, our system OSSINT does not perform any action
on it. Indeed, our system OSSINT, re-builds a list of friends using publicly available
information and not considering or retrieving data from a publicly available friends
list. The friends list then, from the OSSINT point of view, is always considered as
private.
6.1. Experimental Results on Friends Found at 2-Hop
To show the feasibility and effectiveness of our system, we provide a more in depth
analysis which demonstrates that with OSSINT we are able to identify new friend-
ships at 2-hop of distance. Table V depicts an example of the general confusion matrix
we used for our outputs.
Table V: Confusion matrix
Not predicted Predicted
Actually not friend True Negative (TN) False Positive (FP)
Actually friend False Negative (FN) True Positive (TP)
A confusion matrix [Ron and Foster 1998] contains information about actual and
predicted classifications done by a classification system. The entries in the confusion
matrix have the following meaning in the context of our study:
—TN is the number of correct predictions that the 2-hop_ID-# is not friend of v;
—FP is the number of incorrect predictions that the 2-hop_ID-# is friend of v;
—FN is the number of incorrect predictions that the 2-hop_ID-# is not friend of v;
—TP is the number of correct predictions that the 2-hop_ID-# is friend of v.
In order to evaluate Q1 we run OSSINT system on a set of eight users. Differently, to
evaluate the quality of OSSINT we used concepts as precision and recall. The precision
is the fraction of retrieved instances that are relevant while recall is the fraction of
relevant instances that are retrieved. f1 considers both the precision and the recall
of the test to compute the score. It can be considered as a weighted average of the
precision and recall. The value of f1 is large when both precision and recall are good,
and small when either of them is poor. In Formula 1, 2 and 3 the formulas we used.
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Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(1)
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(2)
f1 =
2× Precision×Recall
Precision+Recall
. (3)
The confusion matrix in Table VI summarizes the results of our experiments.
Table VI: Confusion matrix with average results of the experimentation phase
Not predicted Predicted
Actually not friend 253 118
Actually friend 28 11
Table VI demonstrates how our approach is able to use the information from the
1-hop network in order to retrieve new friendships at 2-hop of distance. Our OSSINT
system correctly marked 253 IDs as “NOT FRIEND” and on the other side, OSSINT
has been able to predict an average of 11 new IDs and mark them as “FRIEND”. From
our studies, we can consider the value of “True Positive” as a good result that demon-
strates how our assumptions are correct. Moreover from the above results we can as-
sert that we correctly answered to Q1.
6.2. Experimental Results on Personal Information
Using the data from Table VI we can assert that we are able to find friends at 2-hop
of distance. We want now to show the results regarding the personal information like
education, hometown, current city of a victim user. The OSSINT system highlights,
indeed, a leak of information using the surrounding network of a victim user. The data
showed in Table II underline the possibility to retrieve personal information of a victim
ID that are supposed being private. Table VII shows the percentages of correctness of
the user information in the first two positions.
Table VII: Correctness of retrieved information in position Top-One and Top-Two
Accuracy
Current City Hometown Education
TOP 1 50.00% 75.00% 75.00%
TOP 2 37.50% 12.50% 12.50%
Through our experiments we can assert that the first and highest two values from
the information rate of the 1-hop IDs (Table II), correspond to the real (from real life)
information of our victim ID. From the above results we can assert that we correctly
answered to Q2 as well. Moreover, we demonstrate the correctness of our assumption
showing how it is possible to use the surrounding network of a victim profile in order
to retrieve information related to the real life of our victim ID.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this work is to present a proof-of-concept approach that demonstrates a sig-
nificant privacy issue on Facebook. OSSINT is the second building block of our system
that started with our previous tool SocialSpy [Burattin et al. 2015]. As for the previous
work, also here we exploited only tools publicly available in order to reveal informa-
tion that the victim declared private. OSSINT improves the results of SocialSpy, find-
ing new friendship connections at 2-hop of distance from a victim user. Moreover our
study reveals how the list of friends can be exploited in order to retrieve personal infor-
mation, of a victim profile, like education, hometown, current city. We chose only real
victim profiles from the Facebook social network. In order to better stress our system,
we decided to choose profiles with a little amount of publicly available information, at
least one public picture and not more than thirteen public pictures. This is due to the
fact that a smaller amount of public information entail a greater difficulty of retriev-
ing private information of a victim user. OSSINT shows the feasibility of the new idea
we expressed in [Burattin et al. 2015]. The results of our experiments are now able to
raise a real concern against Facebook. On the other hand, from our experiments, we
hope to create awareness on Facebook users.
7.1. Limitations
As mentioned above, the aim of our project is to present a proof-of-concept and to create
awareness on Facebook users. On the other hand we are aware about the small number
of victim users of our dataset. However the small amount of victim profiles is due to
the fact that Facebook recognizes the pattern of actions. When the same actions are
repeated more and more times, Facebook blocks the attacker for some days. In order
to avoid to be blocked from Facebook we introduced some tricks like:
— random delays;
— fake browsing actions;
— twenty different fake profiles.
Random delays are used between one action and another in order to appear not as
a crawler. Moreover the delays will make our actions as actions from a human profile.
The fake browsing actions are used to vary the actions pattern. We, indeed, introduced
actions like browsing random pages on Facebook. This contributes to appear as a hu-
man that is surfing on Facebook. Moreover, we used twenty different fake profiles in
order to split the payload of our experiments. Furthermore, we used the fake profiles
to appear to Facebook as different users doing different actions into the social network.
Lastly, the exiguous number of victim profiles is due to the stricter rules we applied
to select them. In order to be selected, a profile, need to have a really small amount
of public information, no public information regarding home town, city and university
and not more than 13 public pictures. We chose to apply the aforementioned rules to
select our victim profiles in order to better stress our OSSINT tool, and to prove that
even on a privacy aware user profiles is possible to retrieve (supposed) private infor-
mation. Moreover, we are aware of our low precision rate however these results come
from a long process and OSSINT demonstrated to be able to reduce the research of
new friendships into an OSN environment such as Facebook. Lastly, among our 8 vic-
tim profiles we have been able to have the results above discussed, however it is to
consider that we decided to test the worst case only where our victim users are really
privacy aware having few public information available online. The results discussed
in section 6.1, then, can not be used to represent the overall quality of OSSINT. It is,
then, not possible to take OSSINT for granted against a random victim profile since
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that there is a huge variety of profiles in terms of publicly available information and
privacy settings.
7.2. Future Work
As future work, we want to improve the dataset of victim IDs and rebuild their net-
works. The experiments, indeed, are still an ongoing task in order to have more data.
However, we showed the feasibility of our proof-of-concept and how it is possible to
retrieve (supposedly) hidden information from a random victim user. Moreover, we are
working on our system, OSSINT, in order to introduce new fake actions (e.g., like and
revoke the like of a Facebook page, upload pictures, sharing actions and so on). The
aim of introducing new fake operations is to make our OSSINT as close as possible to
a real human interactions. This update will let us removing the random delays since
that we truly believe that Facebook will not be able to recognize the difference be-
tween our system OSSINT and a real human interactions. Lastly we will improve the
whole system introducing new information to exploit. Indeed we want to use again the
friends list of a victim user in order to retrieve new and more information regarding
our victim ID. A possible information to exploit can be public pictures where our tar-
get ID is tagged rather than comments left on a public friend’s wall from our victim or
comments where our ID has been tagged.
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